L Upper Quadrant Pain

MACROENTES

EXAMPLE SITUATION

Suppose a group of people inside a building, then someone comes along who is stronger than any of these but it would be defeated by any two people. The new visitor, rude and released, to call him the king of the party has a bad habit of singing out loud a bond irritating, "desincentivante."

Then, each of these is encouraged by such silence firecracker. To stop him at least two people would have to come where and giving an argument of force, to sever in their songs. If you approach one, the bold get a strong header that left him out of action.

Now suppose that the present can not communicate with each , the idea would be for someone with initiative, it faces forward with the hope that another will join the cause. What will happen? IF YOU BELIEVE

SOUND ..... It

consider two scenarios:

1. Subjects know the scale of incentives from the rest: In this case each of the subjects he knows that if he faces the king of any other party would support him because you do not you will achieve any risk and also silence him. So at this stage everybody is encouraged to confront him.
2. subjects unaware of the scale of incentives from the rest: The subjects did not know whether to endorse someone would confront him or even reprimanded him, in this case and although the incentives for the subjects are the same as in case 1, you can not avoid singing. CONSIDERATIONS

The example is one of a series of situations that can be described as follows: When attending a game a set of players, where there is a subset of those that have the same system of incentives or the same payoff matrix.

REPLACING A SUBJECT FOR THE GROUP

Theorem

If capacity for communication, whether a subject library that has the maximum value on an event, so the game solution multiplayer is identical if one considers a single rational macroente. (Sufficient condition)

Observe the following case.

betray implies making a false threat of work, following the strategy MIN-MAX each of the people would decide not to cooperate, as is the option that causes minor potential losses, " the you can not play. " However the table complies with the conditions of the theorem, by which the result is the acting work macroente. And this is because both players share information and know that if they work the other inevitably collaborate.

Consider the following table:

This is the payoff matrix for various events typical of dilemma prisoner in this case shows that the theorem does not apply because the maximum utility for both people and events are in fact different. An macroente in this situation choose not to betray.

SECOND CONSIDERATION

total in terms of access to information in a group, if there is a subset of it that meets the conditions of the theorem, then behave as a single macroente. In addition to an individual, there is only one macroente which is capable of containing and operating as such, which corresponds with that macroente event that decides the major incentive of the subject.